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Abstract
Determination of the range of
several standard social choice
correspondences; Borda rule,
plurality rule, top-cycle, the
Copeland rule, approval
voting.
Social choice correspondences might be partially evaluated in terms of what
they do, in terms of what sets get chosen. Presumably we would not think
well of a rule that only selected either one specific singleton {a}, or the set
X of all alternatives. Range conditions could also be part of characterization
results. In this paper we determine the range of several standard social choice
correspondences.
The is a wide variety of such determinations. Assuming strong preference
orderings, any resolute, neutral correspondence has a range consisting of m
singleton sets. Many rules, like Pareto or Borda have a range consisting of all
non-empty subsets of alternatives. The Copeland Rule falls just barely short
of that full range property. In between, the range of plurality voting depends
on detailed relations between the number of individuals and the number of
alternatives.
Let X with cardinality |X | = m ≥ 3 be the set of alternatives and let
N = {1, 2, ..., n} with n ≥ 2 be the set of individuals. A (strong) ordering
on X is a complete, asymmetric, transitive relation on X (non-trivial individ-
ual indifference is disallowed). The highest ranked element of an ordering r is
denoted r[1], the second highest is denoted r[2], etc. Also r[1 : k] is the set of
alternatives in the top k ranks of r. The set of all orderings on X is L(X). A
profile u is an element (u(1), u(2), ..., u(n)) of the Cartesian product L(X)N .
If x ranks above y in u(i), we write x ≻u(i) y.
A social choice correspondence G is a map from the domain L(X)N
to non-empty subsets of X . For a discussion of most of the social choice cor-
respondences in this paper, see, for example Schwartz (1986) and Sen (2017).
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The range of social choice correspondence G is the collection of all sets S such
that there exists a profile u with G(u) = S.
Some range determinations are trivial.
(1) A constant social choice correspondence, say G(u) = {x, y} for all u
obviously has a singleton range.
(2) With strong orderings, a dictatorial social choice correspondence has
a range consisting of the m different singleton sets.
(3) If G(u) = T (u) = ∪iu(i)[1], the set T (u) of the tops of all individual
orderings at u, the range is all non-empty subsets of X of size less than or equal
to n.
For an example that is just above trivial, consider the Pareto optimal cor-
respondence. Alternative y is Pareto dominated by another alternative x
at profile u if, for all i, individual i ranks x above y in u(i). Alternative y
is Pareto optimal at u if it is Pareto dominated by no other alternative at
u. Consider GPa(u) = {x : x is Pareto optimal at u}. Then GPa(u) 6= ∅
since T (u) ⊆ G(u). The range of the Pareto correspondence consists of all
non-empty subsets S of X . Suppose |S| = k. To construct a profile u with
GPa(u) = S, start by putting all of X\S in the bottom m−k ranks in any order
for everyone. Then, for #1, put S in the top k ranks in any ordering O. Follow
that by putting S in the top k ranks for #2 but ordered as in O−1. (Here O−1
is the inverse of O: xO−1y if and only if yOx.) Finally fill in the rest of the
profile in any manner.
For another example at this level, we treat the maximin correspondence
which selects the alternatives whose worst ranking (over individuals) is highest.
Given profile u, let n(u, x) be the largest integer p for which there is an individual
i with u(i)[p] = x. Then the maximin correspondence sets
GM (u) = {x : n(u, x) ≤ n(u, y) for all y ∈ X}.
By neutrality, if we can find a set of k elements in the range of GM , all sets of
k elements are in the range.
For k = 1, we start with the profile u1
1 2 3 · · · n
x x x x
y y y · · · y
z z z z
w w w · · · w
...
...
...
...
with GM (u1) = {x}.
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For k = 2, we construct u2 from u1 by switching the alternatives in first and
second ranks for individual #1:
1 2 3 · · · n
y x x x
x y y · · · y
z z z z
w w w · · · w
...
...
...
...
with GM (u2) = {x, y}.
For k = 3, we construct u3 from u2 by switching the alternatives in second
and third ranks for individuals #1 and #2:
1 2 3 · · · n
y x x x
z z y · · · y
x y z z
w w w · · · w
...
...
...
...
with GM (u3) = {x, y, z}. Continue in this fashion until k is the smaller of m
and n.
Now we take up more complicated cases.
1 The Borda correspondence
At profile u, let s(x, i, u) be the rank of alternative x in i’s ordering (so if, at u,
individual i has x top-ranked, s(x, i, u) = 1). The Borda score for x at u is the
sum
B(x, u) = Σis(x, i, u)
of those ranks over all individuals. Then the Borda correspondence selects
the alternatives with minimal Borda score:
GB(u) = {x ∈ X : B(x, u) ≤ B(y, u) for all y ∈ X}
If n is even, the range of Borda consists of all possible subsets S of X . To
get S, construct the profile u as follows: Let P be an ordering of S and Q be
an ordering of X . u(1) will be P above and X\S below, ordered in any way.
u(2) will be P−1 above and X\S below, ordered in any way. Then half of the
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remaining individuals have ordering Q while the other half have ordering Q−1.
If n is odd, there is a profile u with GB(u) = S unless S = X where |X | is
even. For proof of this, see Kelly and Qi (2016), where also partial results are
given for the range of the Borda social welfare function, which yields social
rankings.
2 Plurality rule
Given a profile u and an element x of X , let nx(u) be the number of individuals
with x top-ranked at u. Alternative x is a plurality winner at u if nx(u) ≥
nz(u) for all z in X . Plurality rule is the social choice correspondence GPl
that, at each profile u, has GPl(u) equal to the set of all plurality winners at u.
The plurality number at u, N(u), is the value of nx for a plurality winner x
at u. When profiles u and u∗ are fixed for a discussion, we simplify nx(u) and
nx(u
∗) respectively to nx and n
∗
x.
For the range of plurality rule, let S be a subset of X so |S| = k ≤ m.
When is S = {x1, x2, ..., xk} in the range of plurality rule? We certainly need
k ≤ n since there are at most n tops. If k|n, let u be a profile where the
first n/k individuals have x1 on top, the next n/k have x2 on top, and so on.
S = GPl(u). If k ∤ n, let n = kq + r with 0 < r < k. Let u be a profile where
the first q individuals have x1 on top, the next q have x2 on top, and so on. If
k = m and r > 0, sets S with |S| = k are not in the range.
If m > k, there are r individuals whose tops at u are still undetermined and
m− k alternatives to use for those tops. For x1, x2, ..., xk to be the plurality
winners, we would need q strictly larger than the highest number needed for a
non-winner:
q >
⌈
r
m− k
⌉
=
⌈
n− qk
m− k
⌉
where ⌈z⌉ is the smallest integer not less than z. Here q is
⌊
n
k
⌋
where ⌊z⌋ is
the largest integer not greater than z. Combining, when
⌊n
k
⌋
>
⌈
n−
⌊
n
k
⌋
k
m− k
⌉
any set of k elements is in the range of plurality rule.
3 The top cycle correspondence
Here GT (u) is the set of maximal alternatives for the transitive closure of the
simple majority voting relation. Given x, y ∈ X , we define the simple majority
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voting (SMV) relation as x %u y just when |{i : x ≻u(i) y}| ≥ |{i : y ≻u(i) x}|.
Let R(u) be the transitive closure of %u. That is, xR(u)y if there is a
sequence x1, x2, ..., xt such that
x %u x1 %u x2 %u ... %u xt %u y
If xR(u)y and yR(u)x, we write x ≈ y. Then GT (u) = {x : xR(u)y for all y}.
Note that if y ∈ GT (u) and xR(u)y, then x ∈ GT (u).
Note first, this rule is neutral, so if we can find a set of k elements in the
range, all sets of k elements are in the range.
Case 1. n odd. For odd n, any one element set is in the range, but no two
element set is. Now we construct, for any subset S of X consisting of three or
more alternatives, a profile u that has S in the range. First we observe that with
three individuals, there is a profile on just S such that the transitive closure of
SMV is social indifference on S. The standard voting paradox shows a profile v
on three individuals and exactly three alternatives that exhibits a voting cycle:
x ≻ y ≻ z ≻ x, and the transitive closure is x ≈ y ≈ z ≈ x. For k = 4, pick
one alternative from {x, y, z}, say y, and a new alternative, w. Now insert w
in each ordering in profile v just below y. That creates a 4-element cycle and
the transitive closure of SMV is social indifference among these 4 alternatives.
Continuing in this manner, we can construct a profile s such that the transitive
closure of SMV is social indifference on S. Now let P be an arbitrary ordering
of X\S and Q is an arbitrary ordering of X , and construct u as follows:
A. For individuals #1-#3, put the elements of S in the top k ranks,
ordered as in the profile s on S and put the elements of X\S in the bottom
m− k ranks ordered as in P ;
B. For odd j, with 3 < j ≤ n, set u(j) = Q;
C. For even j, with 2 < j ≤ n− 1, set u(j) = Q−1.
Then S is the maximal set of the transitive closure of SMV at u.
1 2 3
x z y
y x w
w y v
v w z
z v x
...
...
...
where GT (u) = {x, y, z, w, v}. This example also illustrates that G does not
satisfy the Pareto condition.
Case 2. n even. For even n, every subset is in the range. Let S be any
k-element subset of X for 0 < k ≤ m. Construct profile u as follows, where
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O is an arbitrary ordering of S, P is an arbitrary ordering of X\S and Q is an
arbitrary ordering of X :
A. For #1, put the elements of S in the top k ranks, ordered as in O
and put the elements of X\S in the bottom m− k ranks ordered as in P ;
B. For #2, put the elements of S in the top k ranks, ordered as in O−1
and put the elements of X\S in the bottom m− k ranks ordered as in P ;
C. For odd j, with 1 < j ≤ n− 1, set u(j) = Q;
D. For even j, with 2 < j ≤ n, set u(j) = Q−1.
Then S is the maximal set of the transitive closure of SMV at u.
4 The Copeland rule
Given a profile u and an element x of X , let nx(u) be the Copeland score
2,
the number of alternatives defeated by x under simple majority vote at u. Al-
ternative x is a Copeland winner at u if nx(u) ≥ nz(u) for all z in X . The
Copeland rule is the social choice correspondence GC that, at each profile u,
has GC(u) equal to the set of all Copeland winners at u.
Our focus is on the range of GC . The Copeland correspondence is neutral
and by neutrality, a set S from X is in the range if and only if there is at least
one set T ⊆ X in the range of GC with |S| = |T |. Thus, by an abuse of
language, we will say that k is in the range of GC if there is a u with |GC(u)|
= k. If k is in the range for m and n, it is also in the range for m + 1 and
n (just add an alternative at the bottom of everyone’s ordering). Also, if k is
in the range for m and n, it is also in the range for m and n+ 2 (just add two
individuals with inverse orderings).
Even n
With even n, SMV ties are possible. That makes the determination of
the range much easier. We want to show for any m, n, and any set S of k
alternatives where 1 ≤ k ≤ m, there is a profile at which the Copeland choice
set is S. By the first remarks in this section, it suffices to show this for n = 2.
Let P be any strong ordering on S and Q be any strong ordering on X\S.
Construct u by setting #1’s ordering to be P on top followed by Q and #2’s
ordering to be P−1 on top followed by Q.
Odd n
Now assume all preferences are strong orderings on X and there are an odd
number of individuals. Given profile u, consider the m-term non-increasing
2There is a variant of the Copeland score that is the number of alternatives defeated by x
minus the number of alternatives that defeat x. The distinction between these variants is of
no consequence for our range results.
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sequence (s1, s2, ...sm) obtained from nx(u), ny(u), ... by rearranging according
to magnitude, largest to smallest.
The set GC(u) of maximal elements of R(u) will have k elements just when
the associated sequence s1, s2, ...sm has an initial subsequence of k-elements, all
the same, and then, if k < m, a k+1st element different from the first k. Note
that since there are m(m−1)/2 pairs of distinct alternatives, s1+s2+ ...+sm =
m(m− 1)/2.
For |X | = m, there exists at least one k, with 1 ≤ k ≤ m such that k is not
in the range of GC . To be more precise
(1) If m is even, m is not in the range of GC ;
(2) If m is odd, m− 1 is not in the range of GC .
For (1), note that for m to be in the range of GC , we would have to have a
profile u with associated sequence (s1, s2, ...sm) = (a, a, ..., a) for some positive
integer a. But then we would have s1 + s2 + ... + sm = ma = m(m − 1)/2 so
a = (m− 1)/2 which is only possible if m is odd.
For (2), note that form−1 to be in the range of GC , we would have to have a
profile u with associated sequence (s1, s2, ...sm) = (a, a, ..., a, b) for some positive
integer a, b with b < a. Then s1+s2+ ...+sm = (m−1)a+b = m(m−1)/2 with
0 ≤ b < a. Thus (m− 1)a ≤ m(m− 1)/2 < ma and so (m− 1)/2 < a ≤ m/2,
which is not possible for an integer a if m is odd.
We now show that (1) and (2) are the only exceptions: For n = 3 (and so
also for all larger odd n), and even m > 2, every k, 1 ≤ k < m is in the range
of GC . For n = 3 (and so also for all larger odd n), and odd m, every k,
1 ≤ k ≤ m except m− 1, is in the range of GC .
By what we have already argued, it suffices to show that k appears in the
range ”as soon as possible,” i.e., for odd m, we have k = m in the range for m
alternatives and for even m, we have k = m in the range for m+2 alternatives.
Part 1: m odd. To get k = m in the range for odd m, we construct
profiles where the Copeland score for all m alternatives is 1. First, note that
k = 3 is in the range for m = 3 at the profile u1:
1 2 3
x y z
y z x
z x y
(the classic voting paradox). For later comparison, we have emboldened the
bottom two alternatives in u1(2) and the bottom alternative in u1(3). These
emboldened alternatives make up the whole set of alternatives with no dupli-
cates.
For m = 5, we construct u2 from u1 by inserting two new alternatives, a
and b. Alternative a is inserted at the top of 1’s ordering and at the bottom -
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emboldened - for #3. b is inserted at the bottom of #1’s ordering and at the
top for #2:
1 2 3
a b z
x y x
y
z z y
b x a
Finally, a is inserted at the middle position for #2 and b is inserted in the
middle position for #3 (that b is emboldened):
1 2 3
a b z
x y x
y a b
z z y
b x a
The emboldened alternatives make up the whole set of alternatives with no
duplicates. Each alternative has Copeland score of 2.
For m = 7, we construct u3 from u2 by inserting two new alternatives, c and
d. c is inserted at the top of 1’s ordering and at the bottom - emboldened - for
#2. Alternative d is inserted at the bottom of #1’s ordering and at the top for
#3:
1 2 3
c b d
a y z
x a x
y
z z b
b x y
d c a
Finally, d and c are inserted at the middle position for #2 (where d is
emboldened) and #3:
1 2 3
c b d
a y z
x a x
y d c
z z b
b x y
d c a
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The emboldened alternatives make up the whole set of alternatives with no
duplicates. Each alternative has Copeland score of 3.
We show one more iteration. For m = 9, we construct u4 from u3 by
inserting two new alternatives, r and s. r is inserted at the top of 1’s ordering
and at the bottom - emboldened - for #3. Alternative s is inserted at the
bottom of #1’s ordering and at the top for #2:
1 2 3
r s d
c b z
a y x
x a c
y
z d b
b z y
d x a
s c r
Finally, r and s are inserted at the middle position for #2 and #3 (where s is
emboldened):
1 2 3
r s d
c b z
a y x
x a c
y r s
z d b
b z y
d x a
s c r
The emboldened alternatives make up the whole set of alternatives with no du-
plicates. Each alternative has Copeland score of 4. This process, alternating
which of #2 and #3 has a new alternative inserted at the bottom, can be con-
tinued indefinitely. For general odd m, at the resulting profile every alternative
has Copeland score (m− 1)/2.
Part 2: m even. For even m, k = m−2 is in the range for m alternatives.
This requires only a very simple construction. Suppose we use Part 1 to start
with a profile u for m − 1 alternatives (making up set X∗) such that every
alternative in X∗ has Copeland score (m− 2)/2. Then construct profile u∗ by
inserting a new alternative, say t, as follows:
1. t is made the top-most alternative in u∗(1);
2. t is made the bottom-most alternative in u∗(2);≥
3. For individual #3, t is inserted into the next-to-bottom space, just
above the bottom element, call it z, in u∗(3).
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Then the Copeland scores of the m − 2 alternatives in X∗ other than z
are increased by 1 since they all now defeat t. The Copeland score of z is
unchanged. Since t only defeats z, the Copeland score of t is 1 less than the
maximal Copeland score. The image of GC at u
∗ is X∗\{z}, of cardinality
m− 2.
5 Approval voting
Approval voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1982) is not a collective choice correspon-
dence since different information is used. For a fixed B, where 1 ≤ B ≤ m, an
index vector is an element of BN . An extended social choice correspon-
dence is a correspondence G : L(X)N × BN → X . Given preference profile
u = (u1, ..., un) and index vector b = (b1, ..., bn), the approval voting score for
alternative x is AS(x, u, b) = |{i : x ∈ u(i)[1 : bi]}|, the number of individuals i
who have x in their top bi ranks. Approval voting then is the extended social
choice correspondence GA that sets GA(u, b) = {x : AS(x, u, b) ≥ AS(y, u, b)
for all y in X} where B = M , i.e., individuals can approve any number of
alternatives.
The range of GA is all non-empty subsets of X . Given subset S ⊆ X , with
|S| = k ≥ 1, let u be a profile where every individual has S in their top k ranks
(in any order) and b = (k, k, ..., k). Then GA(u, b) = S.
But one can generally get GA(u, b) = S for index vectors much smaller than
(k, k, ..., k). Given index vector b, let the gauge of b be the maximal value of
the bi components.
Proposition. Let |S| = k ≥ 1.
(1) If k ≥ n, there exists a profile u and an index vector b of gauge
g = ⌈k/n⌉ with GA(u, b) = S;
(2) If k < n, there exists a profile u and an index vector b of gauge
g ≤ 2 with GA(u, b) = S.
Proof : For (1), let u be a profile where the k elements of S are strung
out in the top ⌈k/n⌉ ranks, with one occurrence of each (here illustrated with
k = 2n+ 2):
1 2 3 4 · · · n
x1 x2 x3 x4 xn
xn+1 xn+2 xn+3 xn+4 · · · x2n
x2n+1 x2n+2
...
...
...
...
...
and set b = (⌈k/n⌉, ⌈k/n⌉, ⌈k/n⌉ − 1, ..., ⌈k/n⌉ − 1).
For (2), where n = kq + r for 0 ≤ r < n some care must be taken with
assumptions about m.
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Example. Suppose n = 10 and k = 4. Here q = 2 and you might consider
setting u to be
1 2 3 4 · · · 7 8 9 10
x1 x1 x2 x2 x4 x4 x5 x6
...
...
...
...
...
with b = (1, 1, ..., 1). The problem with this is that while we know m ≥ 4 (since
k = 4), we don’t know m ≥ 6.
We deal with this by enlarging the number of occurrences of an element
of S from q to q + 1 and spilling over to the second rank:
1 2 3 4 · · · 7 8 9 10
x1 x1 x1 x2 x3 x3 x3 x4
x4 x4
...
...
...
...
...
...
with b = (2, 2, 1, ..., 1).
Generalizing, consider first the case of k < n/2. Thus 2k < n and in
n = kq + r we have q ≥ 2 and r < k. We get bounds on k(q+1).
(i) n = kq + r < kq + k = k(q + 1);
(ii) 2n = 2kq + 2r > k(q + 1) + 2r > k(q + 1).
Thus we can string q +1 occurrences of each of k alternatives along the top
rank and then extend part way along the second rank and set b = (2, 2, ..., 2, 1, ..., 1)
as in the way we dealt with the example just above.
Finally, we treat the case where n/2 < k < n and q = 1. We again establish
bounds:
(i) 2k > n since n/2 < k;
(ii) But 2k < 2n since k < n.
Thus we can string 2 = q + 1 occurrences of each of k alternatives along
the top rank and then extend part way along the second rank and set b =
(2, 2, ..., 2, 1, ..., 1) 
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